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Actions speak louder than words, but not nearly as often.Mark Twain
Introduction
There are di¤erent ways to manage and govern a corporation. For instance, visionary managers
often share information with their subordinates to explain their strategy. Some managers rely
on their ability to motivate their followers and adopt a hands-o¤ approach, while others retain
control and overrule their subordinates when their instructions are not followed. As another
example, in many corporations, the board of directors not only monitors and supervises the
CEO but also advises management on topics such as strategy, crisis management, and M&A.
Some boards are friendlyto their CEO who is given the nal say, while others do not hesitate
to confront and replace the CEO as needed. Related, investors such as private equity funds and
activist hedge funds, who often share their ideas with their portfolio companies how to increase
value, also have di¤erent styles of governance. While some investors are quick to exercise their
control rights if their ideas are ignored, others are less confrontational and prefer working
constructively with management. In all of these principal-agent situations, contracts only
partially resolve the conicts of interests, and as a result, communication (i.e., transmission of
information, using words) and intervention (i.e., forcing ones will, taking actions) become the
primary mechanisms of governance.
The goal of this paper is to understand the interaction between communication and inter-
vention, and study its implications for corporate governance. There is an obvious trade o¤
between the two: while communication is e¤ective only if it is persuasive, intervention is more
confrontational and costly. For this reason, intervention is often used as a last resort (Simon
(1947)), and the anticipation of intervention can in and of itself a¤ect the ability to exert
inuence through communication. In principle, the two mechanisms can either complement or
substitute one another. Which one it is? As the examples above suggest, the extent to which
intervention (or the threat of) is used in practice varies considerably. What explains these
di¤erent choices?
To study these questions, I develop a principal-agent model with incomplete contracts and
a top-down information structure.1 As one might expect, a credible threat of intervention
1The main results continue to hold with two-sided information asymmetry. For details, see Section 3.5.
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can increase the incentives of the agent to follow the instructions of the principal, i.e., interven-
tion reinforces compliance. In these cases, the two mechanisms complement one another since
the best way to avoid the unpleasant consequences of intervention is to follow instructions.
Surprisingly, however, the main result of the paper demonstrates that a credible threat of in-
tervention can also decrease the incentives of the agent to follow the principals instructions. In
those cases, intervention prompts disobedience, communication is less e¤ective with interven-
tion than without it, and the two mechanisms substitute one another. This result is new in
the literature. The key insight is that intervention is counterproductive because it tempts the
agent to challenge the principal to back her words with actions. Therefore, a commitment not
to intervene (i.e., relying solely on communication) can be optimal. In this respect, words do
speak louder than (and without) actions.
Building on this core idea, the analysis considers several variants of the baseline model
and provides novel predictions. In the context of corporate leadership, the analysis suggests
that hands-o¤ management style is more suitable for specialist managers (rather than gener-
alists) in opaque and complex organizations where employeescompensation is related to rm
performances. In the context of corporate boards, the model predicts that friendly boards
are optimal when CEOs have less to lose from being monitored (i.e., enjoy high reputation in
the CEO labor market or a generous severance package), their compensation is sensitive to
performances, the number of directors is large, or directors are busy (e.g., hold other board
seats). In the context of private equity and shareholder activism, I argue that sophisticated
investors can have their voice heard more e¤ectively when they have reputation for being non-
confrontational, co-invest with other investors (e.g., LBOsclub deals or VCssyndicates), have
large number of portfolio companies, or have better exit options from their investment (i.e.,
selling their shares, nding a buyer). Specically in the context of shareholder activism, the
analysis highlights that the adoption of an easier proxy access or the facilitation of coordina-
tion among shareholders (e.g., through proxy advisory rms) have unintended consequences
and can be counterproductive. Moreover, the ease at which activists can exit their positions
(e.g., the liquidity of the stock) enhances their ability to inuence management if and only if
running a proxy ght (i.e., intervention) is su¢ ciently costly.
To gain further insight about how intervention prompts disobedience, which is the common
theme behind the implications above, consider the following example. Suppose an agent (he)
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can take one of two actions, L and R. There are three states with a uniform prior. Payo¤s are
given by
Principal L M R
a = L 2 1 0
a = R 0 0 2
Agent L M R
a = L 2 1 0
a = R   2 + ;
where  2 (1; 2). Both players prefer action R in state R and action L in state L, but since
the agent receives an additional private benet  from action R, they disagree in state M . The
principal (she), who is privately informed of the state, sends the agent a message which can
be interpreted as instructions, a recommendation, or a nonbinding demand. Since the agent is
biased toward action R, the challenge is convincing him to choose action L. Communication
is modeled as cheap talk (i.e., strategic transmission of information à la Crawford and Sobel
(1982)). Without the possibility of intervention, an informative equilibrium has the following
properties: (i) the principal sends message mR in state R and message mL otherwise, and
(ii) the agent takes action R (L) if message mR (mL) is sent. In this equilibrium, which
exists if and only if  < 3
2
,2 the principal gets her preferred action in each state. Notice that
because of their conict of interests, the principal never fully reveals her private information
in equilibrium. The agent would like to deviate to action R in state M but not in state L;
because M is pooled with L by the principals message, such a deviation is not possible. In
a sense, the principal deliberately conceals information the agent is likely to abuse.
The novel feature of the model is the possibility of intervention. Suppose that after the
agent acts the principal can pay a cost c > 0 and reverse the agents action. Intuitively,
the principal can overrule the agent and perform the task on her own, force the agent to
repeat the work, monitor the agent closely, or nd a replacement. The cost of intervention
is the principals alternative use of resources, e¤ort, time, and attention, or her aversion to
confrontation. If c  2 (c  1) then the cost is too large (small), and if the agent deviates
to action R after message mL then the principal never (always) intervenes. In those cases,
the possibility of intervention has no e¤ect on the outcome. But if 1 < c < 2 then the above
equilibrium breaks down: the agent knows that if he deviates to action R after message mL,
the principal will intervene if and only if the state is L, which results in precisely the outcome
2Since 2 +  > 0, the agent always chooses action R after message mR. Conditional on message mL, the
agents expected utility from action L and R is 2+12 =
3
2 and , respectively. Therefore, the agent chooses
action L after message mL if and only if 32 < .
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that the agent wants. By contrast, although intervention is optional, the principal is worse o¤
with the possibility of intervention, she now has to pay c to implement action L in state L.
Intuitively, by disobeying the principal, the agent forces her to make a decision that in-
evitably reveals information she was trying to conceal. Indeed, if the agent ignores the prin-
cipals instructions, the principal must decide whether to intervene. Since intervention is an
informed but costly decision, the principal intervenes if and only if she believes that the agents
decision is detrimental, i.e., the state is L. Therefore, if the principal does not intervene, she
e¤ectively conrms the decision of the agent to disobey her instructions. Since the agent
called her blu¤, he can now consume his private benets in state M . On the other hand,
if the principal intervenes, she correctsthe agents initial decision. This correction benets
the agent since it reverses course exactly when the consequences of his actions are detrimental.
Either way, similar to the winners curse in common value auctions and pivotal considerations
in strategic voting, the agent can condition on the information that would be reected by the
decision of the principal to intervene. Altogether, the possibility of intervention creates addi-
tional tension by providing the agent with opportunity to challenge the principal to back her
words with actions. Through this novel channel intervention prompts disobedience.
This core idea holds more generally. Specically, the example above abstracts from the
direct costs borne by the agent when the principal intervenes (e.g., loss of compensation,
damaged reputation, or embarrassment). When considering whether to ignore the principals
instructions, the agent trades o¤ these costs against the benet from eliciting additional
information. The relative cost of intervention, that is, the ratio between the cost borne by the
principal and the cost that intervention inicts on the agent, plays a key role in the analysis.
In Section 2, I show that the likelihood that the agent follows the principals instructions in
equilibrium has a U-shape as a function of this ratio. When the relative cost of intervention is
small, the punishment e¤ect dominates and intervention reinforces compliance; but when the
ratio is large, the informational benets from challenging the principal dominate and inter-
vention prompts disobedience.3 Furthermore, with more than two actions, I show that when
intervention prompts disobedience (reinforces compliance), the agent chooses more (less) ex-
3While other studies argued that intervention can reinforce compliance (e.g., Matthews (1989), Shimizu
(2008), Marino, Matsusaka, and Zábojník (2010), Van den Steen (2010), and Levit (2014)), this paper is the
rst to show that intervention prompts disobedience. The key di¤erences are: (i) here, intervention changes
the agents decision; and (ii) in this model the agent cares to learn about the principals private information.
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treme actions which are more di¢ cult (easier) to reverse, and consequently, the amount of
information that is revealed by the principal in equilibrium is lower (higher).
A commitment not to intervene in the agents decision benets the principal only if inter-
vention prompts disobedience. Therefore, a commitment is optimal when the relative cost of
intervention is su¢ ciently high. In those cases, the principal is better o¤by solely relying on her
ability to communicate with the agent and persuade him to follow her instructions. Moreover,
I show that such commitment is more valuable when the conict of interests with the agent
is small. This result is not obvious since as the conict of interests decreases, communication
becomes more e¤ective both with intervention and without it. Overall, the model provides
novel predictions about the circumstances under which intervention is counterproductive.
The ability of the principal to commit not to intervene in the agents decision, the benet
from such commitment, as well as the channel through which a commitment can be obtained,
depend on the context and the application of the model. In Section 4, I discuss in details
the application of the model to managerial leadership, corporate boards, private equity, and
shareholder activism. These applications share the main elements of the model.
To shed more light on these applications, I extend the baseline model and study situations in
which (i) the principal is a group of individuals who are subject to coordination problems such
as free-riding (e.g., a board of directors); (ii) the principal cannot observe the agents action
before deciding whether to intervene (e.g., an opaque organization/rm); (iii) the quality of the
principals private information is imperfect (e.g., specialist vs. generalist managers, investors
with expertise in a specic industry); (iv) the agent is also privately informed. Interestingly,
when an informed agent disobeys the principal, the principal cannot tell for sure if it is because
the agents private information contradicts her own information or because of their conict of
interests. This force deters the principal from intervening and emboldens the agent. Therefore,
with two-sided information asymmetry, intervention is even more likely to prompt disobedience
and less information is communicated by the principal in equilibrium.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Starting with Dessein (2002), a
number of papers studied the trade o¤ between delegation and strategic communication in
organizations,4 and its applications to optimal board structure (Adams and Ferreira (2007),
Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2016), Harris and Raviv (2008)) and shareholder control (Harris and
4For example, see Agastya, Bag, and Chakraborty (2014), Alonso and Matouschek (2007), Grenadier,
Malenko and Malenko (2017), Mylovanov (2008), and Harris and Raviv (2005).
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Raviv (2010)). In those models, delegation is benecial because it avoids the distortion of the
agents private information when he communicates. By contrast, in my model a commitment
not to intervene in the agents decision, which can be viewed as a form of delegation, is optimal
even if the agent is uninformed (but even more so if he is informed). In this respect, my paper
o¤ers a novel motive for delegation, which has new implications for corporate governance as
I discuss in Section 4. In addition, several papers argue that intervention and monitoring are
undesirable because they weaken the agents incentives to collect information (Aghion and
Tirole (1997)), undertake managerial initiatives (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)), or
cooperate with the board (Adams and Ferreira (2007)).5 In my paper there are no hold-up
problems, and therefore, the benet from a commitment not to intervene in the agents decision
arises under di¤erent circumstances: intervention is less (more) e¤ective as a governance tool
especially when the consequences for the agent from intervention/monitoring are mild (dire).
Finally, existing models in which corporate leaders have informational advantage focus on the
leaders role in coordinating the various activities of the rm (e.g., Hermalin (1998); Bolton,
Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2013)).6 My paper contributes to this literature by showing that
the ease at which corporate leaders can exercise their power diminishes their ability to inuence
others to voluntarily follow their vision.
1 Setup
Consider a principal-agent environment in which payo¤s depend on action x 2 fL;Rg and a
random variable e that has a continuous probability density function f with full support over
; 

. The principals payo¤ is given by v(e; x)  0. In Section 3.4, I consider a version of the
model with a continuum of actions. Let
(e)  v(e; R)  v(e; L) (1)
be a strictly increasing and continuous function with  () < 0 < 
 


. The rst assumption
implies that the relative benet from action R increases with e, and the second assumption
5The idea that ex-post e¢ cient intervention can be ex-ante counterproductive is also discussed by Crémer
(1995). There, however, communication, disobedience, and the interplay with intervention are not studied.
6Rotemberg and Saloner (1993, 2000) also focus on the vision aspect of leadership, but without modeling a
top-down communication. See Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp (2010) for a related survey.
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guarantees that the principals preferences are not trivial: she prefers action R over L if and
only if (e) > 0. To ease the exposition, I use e for (e) and  for  () whenever there is
no risk of confusion.
The agents payo¤ is given by
!  v(e; x) + e  1fx=Rg; (2)
where ! > 0 is a scalar and e is a random variable, privately known to the agent, independent
of e, with a continuous probability density function g and full support over [0;1). Parameter
! is the relative weight the agent puts on v(e; x). The agent prefers action R over L if and
only if e >  e=!. Thus, when e 2 ( e=!; 0) the principal and the agent have di¤erent
preferences over actions. E¤ectively, e captures the intrinsic conict of interests between the
principal and the agent, where larger e and smaller ! result in a larger bias toward action R.
The assumption that e is the agents private information is immaterial for the analysis; its
main role is to ease the exposition of the main results as will become clear later.7
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), I assume that contracts
are incomplete. In particular, the agent and the principal cannot contract over actions or the
communication protocol. Alternatively, e can be interpreted as the residual conict of interests
between the principal and the agent. A residual conict of interests is likely to arise even if
writing a contract that balances between the agents incentives and the principals utility net
of the agents compensation is allowed (for example, increasing !). Intuitively, eliminating
entirely the private benets of the agent is too expansiveas it may require the principal to
give all the pecuniary benets from the project to the agent.8
The model has four stages:
Stage 1: The rst stage involves communication between the principal and the agent. While
the agent is privately informed about e, the principal is privately informed about e. For
simplicity, I assume that the principal perfectly observes e while the agent is uninformed
about e. The former assumption is relaxed in Section 3.3 and the latter assumption is relaxed in
7Assuming Pr[e  0] = 0 is immaterial for the main results. In the Online Appendix I show that similar
results hold when e has full support over ( 1;1) .
8For details on an interpretation of ! as a division of cash-ows, see the remark at the end of Section 2.2.
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Section 3.5. Based on her private information, the principal sends the agent messagem 2 ; .
In line with a standard cheap talk framework, the principals information about e is non-
veriable and the content of m does not a¤ect the agents or the principals payo¤ directly.
These assumptions capture the informal nature of communication. I denote by (e) 2 ; 
the message sent by the principal and by M the set of messages on the equilibrium path.
Stage 2: In the second stage, the agent observes the message from the principal and chooses
between the two actions. I denote by xA(m; e) 2 fL;Rg the decision of the agent conditional
on observing message m and his private benets e.9
Stage 3: The third stage is the key departure of the model from the existing literature.
The principal observes the agents decision and decides whether to intervene and override it.
Formally, let xP (e; xA) 2 fL;Rg be the principals decision. If xP = xA then the principal did
not intervene and the agents decision is implemented. In this case, neither the principal nor
the agent incurs any costs. If xP 6= xA then the principal intervenes and changes the agents
decision.10 In this case, the principal incurs a cost c 2 (0; jj) and the agent incurs a cost
  0. If instead c  jj, then intervention is too costly to have any e¤ect. In the applications
which I discuss in Section 4, the costs  and c can be either pecuniary or non-pecuniary.
Stage 4: Payo¤s are realized and distributed to the principal and the agent. Overall, the
principal and the agent maximize their expected utilities, which are given respectively by
uP (e; xA; xP ; c) =
8<:v(e; xP )  c if xP 6= xAv(e; xA) if xP = xA (3)
and
uA(e; xA; xP ; e;!; ) =
8<:!  v(e; xP ) + e  1fxP=Rg    if xP 6= xA!  v(e; xA) + e  1fxA=Rg if xP = xA: (4)
Solution concept
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game consists of three parts: The principals commu-
nication strategy , the agents decision xA, and the principals intervention strategy x

P .
9Since the agent is indi¤erent with zero probability, I restrict attention to pure strategies.
10A previous version of the paper shows similar results when the agents action can only be partly reversed.
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Specically, the equilibrium is dened as follows: (i) For any realization of e, if (e) = m then
m maximizes the expected utility of the principal conditional on e and given xA and xP where
the expectations are taken with respect to e; (ii) for any message m 2 M , the strategy xA
maximizes the expected utility of the agent given  and xP where the expectations are taken
with respect to e conditional onm; (iii) for any realization of e and xA 2 fL;Rg, xP maximizes
the expected utility of the principal. Finally, all players have rational expectations in that each
players belief about the other playersstrategies is correct in equilibrium. Moreover, the agent
uses Bayesrules to update their beliefs from the principals message about e.11
2 Analysis
I solve the model backward. All omitted proofs are given in the Appendix and Online Appendix.
Consider rst the decision of the principal to intervene. Suppose the agent chooses action R. If
the principal does not intervene, the agents decision is not reversed and the principals payo¤
is v(e; R). If the principal intervenes then the agents decision is reversed and the principals
payo¤ is v(e; L)  c. Therefore, conditional on xA = R, the principal intervenes if and only ife <  c. Suppose the agent chooses action L. Similarly, if the principal intervenes her payo¤ is
v(e; R)  c and otherwise her payo¤ is v(e; L). Conditional on xA = L, the principal intervenes
if and only if c < e. Overall, the principal intervenes whenever she nds the agents initial
decision detrimental.12
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, the principal intervenes if and only if xA = R and e <  c, or
xA = L and c < e.
The next result shows that given message m and expected intervention policy of the prin-
cipal, the agent is more likely to choose action L when his private benets are small.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium and for any message m 2M , there is b (m) such that the agent
chooses action L if and only if e  b (m).
11The principal learns from aA about e, but this information is immaterial for her decision to intervene.
12For this reason, similar results hold if instead the principal chooses the probability that intervention suc-
ceeds, , at a cost of c (), where c0 > 0 and c00 > 0.
10
As in any cheap-talk game, there always exists an equilibrium in which the agent ignores all
messages from the principal, and these messages are uninformative. These equilibria are often
referred to as babbling equilibria and their outcome is equivalent to assuming no communication
between the principal and the agent.
Proposition 1 A babbling equilibrium always exists. In any babbling equilibrium the agent
chooses action L if and only if e  bN where
bN =  Pr[
e <  c]  Pr[c < e]
Pr[ c < e < c]   !E[ej   c < e < c]: (5)
The principal intervenes as described by Lemma 1.
Without communication, the agent cannot avoid intervention even if he forgoes his private
benets and chooses action L. If bN  0 then the agent follows his biasand chooses action R
with probability one, even though it triggers intervention by the principal whenever c <  e. If
bN > 0 then the agent goes against his biasand chooses action L when e is small. Intuitively,
based on his prior about e, the agent believes that action L is less likely to trigger intervention
than action R.
With communication, the principal can inuence the agents decision by sending the ap-
propriate message. Communication is e¤ective only if in equilibrium the principal reveals
information about e and the agent conditions his decision on this information with a positive
probability. I refer to equilibria with this property as inuential.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is inuential if there exist 0  0 and m1 6= m2 2 M such that
E[ejm1] 6= E[ejm2] and xA(m1; 0) 6= xA(m2; 0).
Since the principal uses her inuence to maximize her expected payo¤ as given by (3), in
any inuential equilibrium there are exactly two disjoint sets of messages on the equilibrium
path, MR and ML, with distinctive properties. Messages in MR maximize the probability
that the agent chooses action R, and messages in ML maximize the probability that the agent
chooses action L. Therefore, messages in MR can be interpreted as instructions to choose R,
and messages inML can be interpreted as instructions to choose L. Note that bothMR andML
can have more than one message in equilibrium.13 Based on (3), if the equilibrium is inuential
13Formally, MR  argminm2M b (m) and ML  argmaxm2M b (m). If the equilibrium is inuential then it
must be minm2M b (m) < maxm2M b (m).
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then e  0) m 2 MR and e < 0) m 2 ML. Hereafter, I use the terminology instructing
the agent to describe the principals communication strategy. Overall, if the equilibrium is
inuential then the principal instructs the agent to choose action R if e  0 and action L ife < 0.
An inuential equilibrium exists only if the agent nds it in his best interests to follow the
principals instructions. Suppose the principal sends a message m 2 MR. The agent follows
the instructions and chooses action R if and only if
!E[v(e; R)jm] + e  Pr[e  cjm](!E[v(e; L)je  c;m]) + (6)
Pr[e > cjm](!E[v(e; R)je > c;m] + e   ):
The left hand side of (6) is the agents expected payo¤ if he follows instructions. In this case,
the principal does not intervene, action R is implemented, and the agent consumes his private
benets. The right hand side of (6) is the agents expected payo¤ if he disobeys the principal
and chooses action L. According to Lemma 1, if e > c then the principal intervenes, the agents
decision is reversed, and he incurs an additional cost . Since e  0 andm 2MR , e  0, the
inequality in (6) always holds. Therefore, the agent always follows the principals instructions
to choose action R.
The challenge of the principal is convincing the agent to choose action L. Suppose the
principal sends a message m 2ML. The agent follows the instructions and chooses action L if
and only if
!E[v(e; L)jm]  Pr[e   cjm](!E[v(e; R)je   c;m] + e) + (7)
Pr[e <  cjm](!E[v(e; L)je <  c;m]  ):
The left hand side of (7) is the agents expected payo¤ if he follows instructions. In this case,
the principal does not intervene and action L is implemented. The right hand side of (7) is
the agents expected payo¤ if he disobeys the principal and chooses action R. If e <  c then
the principal intervenes, the agents decision is reversed, and he incurs an additional cost .
If e   c then the principal does not intervene, the agents decision is unchanged, and he
consumes his private benets. The next result shows that the agent follows the principals
instructions if and only if e  b (; c), which is given by expression (8) below.
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Proposition 2 An inuential equilibrium always exists. Moreover,
(i) In any inuential equilibrium the principal instructs the agent to choose action R if and
only if e  0. If the principal instructs the agent to choose action R, the agent chooses
action R with probability one and the principal never intervenes. If the principal instructs
the agent to choose action L, the agent chooses action L if and only if e  b (; c), where
b (; c) =  Pr[
e <  c]
Pr[ c  e < 0]   !E[ej   c  e < 0]: (8)
If the agent follows the instructions to choose action L then the principal never intervenes.
If the agent ignores the instructions to choose action L, the principal intervenes if and
only if e <  c.
(ii) Every inuential equilibrium Pareto dominates every non-inuential equilibrium.
Since a larger b (; c) implies a higher probability that the agent follows the instructions of
the principal in equilibrium, the threshold b (; c)measures the e¤ectiveness of communication.
Corollary 1
(i) b (; c) strictly increases with  and !.
(ii) If =!  E[eje < 0] + jj then b (; c) decreases with c. If =! < E[eje < 0] + jj
then b (; c) strictly increases with c if and only if c 2  cmin; jj where cmin 2 (0; jj)
is the unique solution of
!cmin = + b
 
; cmin

: (9)
Part (i) of Corollary 1 is intuitive: the principal intervenes only if the agent ignores her
instructions, and in order to avoid the negative consequences of intervention, the agent is
more likely to follow the principals instructions when  is higher. Also, as ! increases, the
conict of interests between the principal and the agent is e¤ectively smaller, and therefore,
the agent is more likely to follow the principals instructions. Part (ii) is more subtle. Figure
1 depicts b (; c) as a function of c when e = e  U [ 1; 1], ! = 1, and  = 0:02. At any
point above the blue curve the agent ignores the principals instructions and chooses action
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R with probability one. At any point below the blue curve the agent follows the principals
instructions. Seemingly, the ability of the principal to inuence the agent should decrease
with the cost of intervention, as in those instances the threat of intervention is less credible.
Corollary 1 shows that this intuition is misleading when c is large. In fact, it can be shown
that if  = 0 then cmin = 0 and b (0; c) is increasing in c. I defer the discussion on the intuition
behind this result to Section 2.1.
Figure 1 - Comparative statics of b with respect to c
According to Proposition 2, the probability of intervention in equilibrium is
 (; c)  Pr[e  b (; c)] Pr[e <  c]: (10)
The principal does not need to intervene if the agent follows her instructions. Since b (; c)
increases with  and !,  (; c) is decreasing in  and !. By contrast,  (; c) has an inverted
U-shape as a function of c. Figure 2 illustrates this point when e = e  U [ 1; 1], ! =
1, and e  U [0; 1]. Intuitively, when c is small the principal can inuence the agent through
communication. Intervention serves only as a threat, which results with a low probability of
intervention. However, if c is large, intervention is too costly and the principal is less likely to
intervene even if the agent disobeys her. Therefore, intervention is observed only if it is not
credible enough to deter the agent from ignoring the principals instructions, but it is su¢ ciently
protable as a corrective tool.14 As a result, unobserved intervention is not necessarily evidence
that intervention is ine¤ective.
14Figure 2 also illustrates that the probability of intervention in any babbling equilibrium (the black line) is
higher than in any inuential equilibrium. The formal proof is in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 2 - Probability of intervention in equilibrium
Remark on equilibrium selection Since multiple equilibria always exist, hereafter, I as-
sume that the equilibrium in play is inuential (which always exists). Selecting the most
informative equilibrium is standard in the literature. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 also supports
this selection.15
2.1 Does intervention prompt disobedience?
To understand the interaction between communication and intervention, consider a benchmark
in which intervention is either prohibitively costly or entirely ine¤ective. This is a special case
of the baseline model with c > jj. According to Proposition 2,
lim
c!jj
b (; c) =  !E[eje < 0]: (11)
Therefore, communication is considered less e¤ective with intervention than without it if and
only if
b (; c) <  !E[eje < 0]: (12)
If condition (12) holds then intervention prompts disobedience, and otherwise, intervention
reinforces compliance. The next result follows immediately from (12).
15It can be shown that an application of NITS criterion by Chen et al. (2008) to this setup would also select
the inuential equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 Suppose c < jj. Intervention prompts disobedience if and only if
=! < E[eje < 0]  E[eje <  c]: (13)
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3, note that the agent is willing to forgo her
private benets and choose action L if he learns that e <  e=!. However, in equilibrium, the
principal does not reveal whether e <  e =! or e 2 [ e=!; 0). The principal intentionally
conceals this information, because if she did not, the agent would have chosen action R whene >  e=!. Instead, the principal pretends that e is lower than it really is in order to persuade
the agent to choose L even when e >  e=!. The agent understands the principals incentives,
and hence, the only information that can be inferred from the instructions to choose action L
is e < 0.
Intervention allows the agent to elicit information from the principal that is otherwise not
revealed by her instructions. If the agent ignores the principals instructions, the principal
has to decide whether to intervene. Intervention is an informed decision. In equilibrium, the
principal intervenes only if she is convinced that the implementation of action R is su¢ ciently
detrimental to justify incurring the costs of intervention. Therefore, the principals decision
to intervene reveals the value of e relative to  c. In particular, if the principal does not
intervene, the agent infers that the principal believes that choosing action R does not justify
intervention, that is, e >  c. These are the states in which the agent prefers consuming his
private benets even at the expense of a lower value of v(e; x). In those cases, the principals
decision not to intervene conrmsthe agents initial decision to disobey. On the other hand,
if the principal intervenes, the agent infers that the principal believes that choosing action R is
detrimental, that is, e <  c. Since the agent is also concerned about the value of v(e; x), he
prefers forgoing his private benets when he learns that e is low. In those cases, intervention
benets the agent since it correctshis initial decision when it is indeed detrimental.
By ignoring the principals instructions the agent e¤ectively forcesthe principal to make
an informed decision which inevitably reveals information about e she was trying to conceal.
Against this informational benet, the agent su¤ers the direct cost of intervention, . Com-
bined, the agent benets from the principals intervention if and only if !e + e <  . Note
that when deciding whether to intervene, the principal behaves as if she is biased toward action
R, where the bias is c. Therefore, if !c   + e then the principals bias coincides with
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the preferences of the agent. As can be seen by (9), the minimum of b (; c) as a function of
c is obtained when !c =  + b (; c). When c = cmin the agents informational benet from
intervention is the highest, and hence, the likelihood that the agent follows the principals
instructions is the lowest. This also explains the intuition behind part (ii) of Corollary 1.
Proposition 3 also implies that intervention is more likely to prompt disobedience when the
conict of interests between the principal and the agent is smaller (high !). Note that higher
! increases the inuence of the principal over the agent both with and without intervention.
However, Proposition 3 suggests that the positive e¤ect of ! is weaker with intervention. There
are two reasons behind this result. First, without intervention, the only force that governs the
incentives of the agent to comply is learning about e. By contrast, with intervention, the
agent also tries to avoid the cost , and therefore, the e¤ect of ! is weaker. Second, the agents
informational benets from disobedience increase with !, as the agent has stronger incentives
to learn about e. Therefore, agents who are compensated for performances are more likely
to comply with instructions without the possibility of intervention. In this respect, pay for
performances and intervention are substitutes.
Figure 3 - The e¤ect of intervention on disobedience
Overall, the possibility of intervention creates additional tension between the principal
and the agent. Condition (13) reects the agents trade-o¤ between the direct cost from
intervention and the benet from the information in the principals decision to intervene.
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Figure 3 illustrates that when e = e  U [ 1; 1] and ! = 1, condition (13) becomes 
c
<
1
2
. Importantly, intervention prompts disobedience only because intervention is an informed
decision. Hypothetically, if the principal could commit to intervening whenever the agent
ignores her instructions, then intervention would necessarily reinforce compliance. Intuitively,
since the principals decision to intervene does not depend on e, ignoring the instructions of
the principal imposes a direct cost on the agent without providing the informational benet of
correction and conrmation.
Remark on biased self-perception The analysis does not depend on the cost of interven-
tion itself, but rather on the belief of the agent about the principals self-perception of this cost.
For example, if it is a common knowledge that the principal underestimates (overestimates)
the di¢ culty of intervening in the agents decision, for all purposes of the analysis, the relevant
cost of intervention is lower (higher). Therefore, an overcondent principal, who behaves as if
the cost of intervention c is smaller than it really is, will be able to exert more inuence on
the agent through communication if and only if c < cmin. In those cases, overcondence can
benet the principal.16
2.2 The value of intervention
The principals perspective If intervention prompts disobedience then the principal can
benet from a commitment not to intervene in the agents decision. Building on Proposition
2, the principals expected payo¤ in any inuential equilibrium is
UP (; c) = E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e  0]E[eje  0] + (14)
Pr[e > b (; c)] Pr[ c  e < 0]E[ej   c  e < 0]   (; c) c;
where  (; c) is given by (10). The rst line of (14) is the principals expected utility if her
rst best is implemented. The second line is the principals expected disutility when the agent
disobeys her. The rst term in that line is the disutility when principal does not intervene and
the second term is the disutility when she does.
16In a di¤erent context, Gervais and Goldstein (2007) show that overcondence can be desired in rms that
face e¤ort coordination problems.
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Several implications follow. First, since b (; c) increases with  and !, so does UP (; c).
Intuitively, with higher  or ! the agent has stronger incentives to follow the principals in-
structions either because he tries to avoid the costs of intervention or because he puts a smaller
weight on his private benets. This benets the principals since she can exert inuence on the
agent without incurring the cost of intervention. Second, the principal obtains the highest
payo¤ when c = 0. Interestingly,
lim
c!0
b (; c) =
8<:1 if  > 00 if  = 0: (15)
That is, if  > 0 the principal obtains her rst best without ever intervening in equilibrium;
the threat is su¢ cient. However, if  = 0 then the principal intervenes with probability one to
obtain her rst best. Third, in most applications intervention is costly. The next result shows
that although intervention is optional, if c is large then a commitment not to intervene in the
agents decision can benet the principal.
Proposition 4 UP (; c) increases in  and !. Moreover,
(i) If =!  E[eje < 0] + jj then UP (; c) decreases in c.
(ii) If =! < E[eje < 0] + jj then there is c 2 (c; jj) such that UP (; jj) > UP (; c)
for all c 2 (c; jj).
How can the principal be better o¤without the option to intervene? This is possible only if
intervention prompts disobedience. Based on Proposition 3, it is necessary that c > c, where
c is the value of c that satises condition (13) with equality. If c 2 (c; c] then intervention
can still partly substitute for communication, and it is therefore preferred by the principal
even though it prompts disobedience. In those cases, intervention is probable but still desired
by the principal. However, as c further increases, intervention becomes more expensive and
less desirable as a substitute for communication. If c > c then the principal is better o¤
without the option to intervene. In this region, the principal prefers e¤ective communication
over ine¤ective intervention. In this respect, words speak louder without actions. In fact, since
every inuential equilibrium Pareto dominates every non-inuential equilibrium (part (ii) of
Proposition 2), having only the option to communicate is also superior to having only the
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option to intervene. Put di¤erently, in this region, words also speak louder than actions. These
observations are illustrated by the left panel of Figure 4, which plots the principals expected
payo¤ as a function of c when e = e  U [ 1; 1], ! = 1, and e  U [0; 1]. The right panel of
Figure 4 shows that a commitment not to intervene in the agents decision is optimal only if 
is small relative to c.
Figure 4 - The value of intervention from the principals perspective
Notice that the condition in part (ii) of Proposition 4 is more likely to hold when ! is large.
Indeed, recall that communication is more e¤ective without intervention when ! is large. For
this reason, as the conict of interests between the principal and the agent is mitigated, the
principal prefers committing not to intervene in the agents decision. In the Online Appendix,
I show that if e is exponentially distributed then lim!!1 [UP (; jj)  UP (; c)] > 0 for all
c 2 (0; jj).
The agents perspective The agents expected payo¤ in any inuential equilibrium is
UA (; c) = !E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e  0](!E[eje  0] + E[e]) + (16)
Pr[ c  e < 0] Pr[e > b (; c)]E[e b (; c) je > b (; c)];
The rst line of (16) is similar to the rst line of (14), with the adjustment of ! and the addition
of the agents private benets. The second line of (16) is the agents expected net benet from
disobeying the principal, which is given by e b (; c). By revealed preferences, this term is
always positive.
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The value of the agents option to disobey the principal decreases with , and therefore,
UA (; c) decreases with  as well. Also, since v(e; x)  0, higher ! increases the payo¤ of the
agent without harming his option to disobey the principal. As the next result shows, the e¤ect
of c is more subtle.
Proposition 5 UA (; c) decreases in  and increases in !. Moreover,
(i) If =!  E[eje < 0] + jj then UA (; c) increases in c.
(ii) If =! <  E[e=!je=! >  E[eje < 0]] + jj then there is c 2 (c; jj) such that
UA (; c) > UA (; jj) for all c 2
 
c; jj.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 is intuitive: to avoid the punishment e¤ect of intervention, the
agent prefers a principal who is unlikely to intervene (high c). By contrast, according to part
(ii), the agent can be better o¤ with a principal that has the option to intervene. Intuitively,
intervention benets the agent since it forces the principal to use information that she would
not have used otherwise. This informational benet denominates the punishment e¤ect when
 is low and ! is high. For this reason, and perhaps ironically, a commitment not to intervene
in the agent decision can be desired by the principal but not by the agent.
Remark Parameter ! can be interpreted as the division of cash-ows between the agent and
the principal. Under this interpretation, ! 2 (0; 1) and the principals utility is rewritten as
(1  !)uP (e; xA; xP ; c1 ! ). The analysis of the model under this interpretation is the same as
in Section 2, with the following two exceptions. First, higher ! reduces the principals share of
v(e; x), and therefore, could harm her even if it increases her inuence on the agent. Second,
higher ! decreases the incentives of the principal to intervene. E¤ectively, the principal behaves
as if her cost of intervention is c
1 ! instead of c. This force is another reason why intervention
is more likely to prompt disobedience when ! is high.
3 Extensions
In this section I consider several extensions to the baseline model.
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3.1 Multiple principals
Suppose there are N  2 principals and one agent (e.g., a board of directors, consortium of
investors). The utility function of each principal is given by (3) and each principal observese. The key di¤erence from the baseline model is that if T  N principals intervene then the
agents decision is reversed with probability T=N , and with probability T=N his decision does
not change. Each principal incurs the cost c if and only if she decides to intervene, and the
agent incurs the cost  if and only if intervention succeeds. The decisions to intervene are
made simultaneously. These assumptions emphasize the free-rider problem among principals.
Since there is no other conict of interests between the principals, they will always agree on
the instructions that should be sent to the agent and on the action that should be implemented
upon intervention (e.g., a majority is obtained if a formal vote is required). The baseline model
is a special case where N = 1.
Since all principals would like to avoid intervention, they collectively instruct the agent
to choose action R if and only if e  0, and they never intervene if the agent follows their
instructions. Similar to the baseline model, the agent always follows the instructions to choose
action R. Suppose the agent disobeys the instructions to choose action L. If e >  c then
no principal intervenes. If e <  c then a symmetric equilibrium requires that each principal
intervenes with probability e 2 [0; 1]. The benet of each principal from intervention condi-
tional on e and other N   1 principals follow strategy e is  e  N 1
N
e + 1
N
  c, where N 1
N
e
is the expected probability of successful intervention employed by the other N  1 principals.17
Similarly, the expected benet from nonintervention is  eN 1
N
e. Therefore, in equilibrium,
each principal intervenes if and only if e <  Nc, and the probability of intervention is one ife <  Nc and zero otherwise. Essentially, the equilibrium is the same as the one described by
Proposition 2, with the exception that the cost of intervention is Nc instead of c. Intuitively,
because of the free-rider problem, each principal internalizes only a fraction 1=N of the total
benet from intervention, and therefore, is less likely to intervene. Therefore, the comparative
statics of c can be interpreted as a comparative statics of N . In particular, there is an inverted
U-shape relationship between N and the frequency of intervention, and a U-shape relationship
between N and the collective ability of principals to exert inuence through communication.
17The probability of success has a binomial distribution with parameters e and N   1.
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3.2 Unobservable actions
Suppose the principal does not observe the agents decision before she intervenes. This corre-
sponds to situations in which the organization is opaque or complex. The principal can still
intervene as in the baseline model and dictate the nal decision, however, she incurs the cost c
regardless of the agents actual decision (otherwise, we are back to the baseline model). I also
assume that if the principal intervenes but eventually did not change the agents action, the
agents does not incur any additional cost.
In this extension, the principal still has incentives to instruct the agent to choose action R
if and only if e  0. Similar to the baseline model, the agent always follows the instructions
to choose action R. Suppose the principal instructs the agent choose action L, and let G
be the probability that the agent follows this instruction in equilibrium. Then, the principal
intervenes if and only if e <   c
1 G . In the Online Appendix, I show that Proposition 2
continues to hold with the exception that the threshold b (; c) is given by the solution of
b = b(;
c
1 G (b)): (17)
While the solution is not necessarily unique, it always exists. According to Corollary 1, if
c > cmin then b (; c) increases with c. Therefore, if c > cmin then b > b (; c), which
means that the principal has more inuence on the agent when she does not observe his action.
Intuitively, when the principal cannot observe the agents decision before she decides whether
to intervene, the benet from intervention is smaller. This situation is equivalent to having
a higher cost of intervention. The only complication is that the benet from intervention is
endogenous, as it depends on the incentives of the agent to follow the principals instructions,
which in turn depends on the incentives of the principal to intervene. This result shows that
intervention is more likely to prompt disobedience in organizations that lack transparency.
3.3 Partially informed principal
Suppose the principal is partially informed about e (e.g., a generalist manager). For example,
the principal observes signal
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es =
8<:e with probability  2 [0; 1]e" with probability 1  ; (18)
where e" and e are identically and independently distributed. The principal does not know
whether es = e or es = e". Parameter  is the quality of the principals private information. The
baseline model is a special case where  = 1. For simplicity, I also assume E[e] = 0.
In the Online Appendix, I show that similar to Proposition 2 the agent follows the principals
instructions if and only if e  b (=; c=), and similar to Proposition 3 intervention prompts
disobedience if and only if
=(!) < E[eje < 0]  E[eje   c=]: (19)
As  decreases, the instructions of the principal become a weaker signal of e and the agents
informational benets from intervention decrease. Therefore, the punishment from intervention
has a larger impact on the agents incentives. This e¤ect, which is reected by the scaling of
 by  in (19), extends the region in which intervention reinforces compliance. On the other
hand, the principal has a larger cost of intervention per unit of information, and therefore, she
is less likely to intervene. This e¤ect, which is reected by the scaling of c by  in (19), extends
the region in which intervention prompts disobedience. When the distribution of e is uniform,
these a¤ects are cancelled out, and condition (19) is equivalent to (13) for any  2 (0; 1).
Interestingly, without intervention, the agents compliance increases with : the agent has
more reasons to follow the principals instructions if the latter has more information. However,
with intervention, the agents compliance can decrease with .18 Intuitively, the informational
benets from disobedience increase with . Therefore, the agent has fewer incentives to chal-
lenge a relatively uninformed principal. As a result, better informed principals benet relatively
more from a commitment not to intervene in the agents decisions.
3.4 Continuum of actions
In this section, I consider an extension of the model in which the agent chooses from a contin-
uum of actions. For this purpose, consider the leading example of Crawford and Sobel (1982),
18In the Online Appendix, I provide su¢ cient conditions under which @@ [b
 (=; c=)] < 0.
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which has been used extensively in the literature on communication and delegation. In partic-
ular, suppose x 2 [; ], v(e; x) =  (e   x)2, and the agents payo¤ is v(e + ; x) where  > 0
is a scalar. In addition, suppose that if the agent chooses xA and the principal intervenes by
choosing xP , the principal incurs an additional cost of c (xP   xA)2 and the agent incurs an
additional cost of  (xP   xA)2, where c > 0 and   0. Intuitively, intervention has more
consequences as the distance between xP and xA grows. Crawford and Sobel (1982) is a special
case of this model where c =1 and  = 0.
Proposition 6 Suppose the principal sends messagem in equilibrium. Then, the agent chooses
action
xA(m) = E[ejm] +  1 + c=c+ c; (20)
and the principals intervention strategy is
xP (xA;e) = xA + e   xA1 + c : (21)
Moreover, the set of communication strategies () that arises in equilibrium under parameter
values (; c; ) is identical to the set of communication strategies that arises in equilibrium
under parameter values ( 1+c
=c+c
;1; 0).
According to Proposition 6, the decision of the agent in equilibrium reects a bias of  1+c
=c+c
.
Intuitively, the agent anticipates the intervention of the principal and adjusts his decision
accordingly. If 1+c
=c+c
> 1, which holds if and only if c > , then the decision of the agent
conditional on message m is more extreme than it would have been without intervention. The
agent expects the principal to intervene by adjusting his decision xA by
e xA
1+c
. As one might
expect, the intensity of intervention is decreasing in c and increasing in the distance of xA frome, the principals ideal point. By over-shootingand choosing an extreme action, the agent
ensures that the action that is eventually implemented by the principal is closer to his own
ideal point, e+. This element is missing from the baseline model. Since the principal corrects
the decision of the agent only if it is su¢ ciently distant from e, similar to the intuition in the
baseline model, over-shooting is not as costly from the agents perspective. By contrast
if 1+c
=c+c
< 1 then the agent moderates his decision in order to avoid the punishment from
intervention, as reected by the cost .
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Proposition 6 also implies that the nature of communication in equilibrium of the game with
intervention is identical to the nature of communication in equilibrium of the game without
intervention, where the bias of the agent is adjusted from  to  1+c
=c+c
. Importantly, according
to Crawford and Sobel (1982), under the most informative equilibrium the quality of commu-
nication improves when the principal and the agent have closer preferences, that is, when  is
smaller. Moreover, in the Crawford and Sobels setup the agents compliance decreases with 
in the sense that the actions of the agent in equilibrium are further away from the principals
ideal points as inferred from her messages. Therefore, Proposition 6 implies that intervention
prompts disobedience if and only if

1 + c
=c+ c
>  , c > ; (22)
an observation which is consistent with Proposition 3. However, di¤erent from the baseline
model, here the quality of communication and the precision of the principals message (i.e., the
number of intervals in the cheap-talk equilibrium partition) also change with the possibility of
intervention. In particular, when intervention reinforces compliance (c < ), more information
is revealed by the principal in equilibrium (the partition is ner), and when intervention is
counterproductive, the principals messages become nosier (the partition is coarser).
3.5 Informed agent
In this section I consider the setup of Section 3.4 with two-sided information asymmetry.
Specically, suppose e = eP + eA, the principal is privately informed about eP , the agent is
privately informed about eA, and eP and eA are independent.
Proposition 7 Suppose the principal sends message m in equilibrium. Then, conditional oneA, the agent chooses action
xA(eA;m) = eA + E[eP jm] + 1 + c
c
; (23)
and the principals intervention strategy is
xP (xA;eP ;m) = xA + eP   E[eP jm]  1+cc 
1 + c
: (24)
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Moreover, the set of communication strategies () that arises in linear equilibrium under pa-
rameter values (; c; ) is identical to the set of communication strategies that arises in equi-
librium under parameter values ( 1+c
c
;1; 0).19
Proposition 7 shows that the decision of the agent in equilibrium depends on his private
information about eA and reects a bias  1+cc . Similar to Proposition 6, the set of communica-
tion strategies is identical to the one in a game without intervention and a bias  1+c
c
. However,
notice that here  1+c
c
>  for all c < 1. That is, intervention always prompts disobedience
and reduces the quality of communication, even if  is arbitrarily large. In this respect, the
main result is getting even stronger when the agent is privately informed.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 7, notice that in a sharp contrast to the
analysis in Section 3.4,  has no e¤ect on the equilibrium (the informed agent behaves as if
 = 0). If the agent is uninformed, larger  weakens his incentives to choose actions that are
distant from the principals ideal point. However, when the agent is privately informed abouteA, choosing a distant action does not increase the intensity of intervention by the principal.
In equilibrium, the principal infers eA from the agents decision and updates her ideal point
accordingly. In particular, the principal rationally interprets distant actions as strong signals
about eA. For this reason, taking an action that is closer to the principals ideal point fails
to reduce the intensity of intervention since the principal attributes it to changes in eA. In
equilibrium, the principal learn from xA about eA and intervenes to undo the bias in the agents
initial decision, taking into account the cost of intervention. The intensity of intervention, which
is measured by 1
1+c
(eP  E[eP jm]  1+cc ), is independent of xA, and therefore, it is beyond the
agents control. For this reason,  does not factor into the agents consideration when choosing
xA. More generally, this observation implies that when the agent is privately informed, the
punishment that intervention imposes on the agent has a weaker disciplinary e¤ect. The agent
takes more extreme actions in anticipation of the principals intervention, knowing that the
principal will intervene more aggressively only if eP justies doing so.
Finally, notice that if  > 0 then 1+c
c
> 1+c
=c+c
. That is, with private information, the agent
is less likely to comply with the principals instructions, and consequently, communication
becomes nosier. This result does not hold when the principal does not have the option to
19A linear equilibrium means that the agents decision is linear in eA. Notice that without intervention (i.e.,
c =1) all equilibria are linear.
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intervene. In those cases, the amount of information that is communicated by the principal is
invariant to the agents private information (Harris and Raviv (2005)).
4 Applications
In this section I discuss four main applications of the model.
4.1 Managerial leadership
Leadership is often dened as the ability to inuence and motivate others to achieve a certain
goal successfully (e.g., Hermalin (1998)). It involves articulating a strategy that is appropriate
given the organizations strategic position and the environment it faces. Without the ability
to persuade others to follow their vision, leaders have to choose between a compromise with
an undesired outcome and exercising their authority to bring about a change. The extent to
which leaders can use their power depends on various characteristics of the organization and its
leadership. As a general message, the model suggests that the ease at which corporate leaders
can exercise their power can diminish their ability to inuence others to voluntarily follow their
vision. In this regard, the model can be applied to study interactions between managers and
their subordinates, owners of small businesses and their employees, rms and labor unions, or
CEOsnheadquarters and division managers.
As an example, consider the interaction between the CEO of a company (principal) and
a representative division manager (agent). The rm has to decide whether to stick with the
status quo (x = R) or reorganize the operations of the division (x = L), for example, by
divesting some of its assets, standardizing its products, introducing new IT systems, focusing
on new geographical areas or products, etc. These decisions are not contractible since their
attractiveness depend on a variety of macro, industry, and rm-specic factors which cannot be
perfectly anticipated. The CEO has superior knowledge on the benet from changing the status
quo, e. For example, if the proposal is to divest assets, the CEO has a better understanding
of the market conditions, demand for corporate assets by investors, and the external cost
of nancing. If the proposal is to enter new markets, the CEO has a better knowledge of
the complementarities with other products of the company, unwanted cannibalization, and
alternative investment opportunities. While the CEO is interested in maximizing the value of
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the whole rm, the division manager is biased toward maximizing the prots of his division. In
particular, the division manager could be biased toward maintaining the status quo (e > 0).
Generally, the conict of interests arises because the division manager is being compensated
based on the protability of his division or because of his career concerns (his skills are better
reected in the performances of his division). The bias can also stem from private benets
(e.g., the prestige of controlling larger assets) or costs (the e¤ort that the implementation of a
new strategy requires).
The CEO will lay out her vision and try to persuade the division manager to follow her
strategy. If she is unsuccessful, the ability of the CEO to intervene and implement the strategy
in spite of the division managers resistance (parameter c) depends on factors such as the
CEOs managerial style (e.g., hands-o¤ approach), the CEOs characteristics (e.g., aversion
to confrontation), the autonomy that was granted to the division over its operations, the
complexity of the implementation of the proposed strategy, and the busyness of the CEO (e.g.,
the alternative cost of intervention is higher when the CEO oversees larger rms). In turn,
intervention is likely to harm the division managers reputation, ego, or compensation ( > 0).
Applied to this context, the model suggests that CEOs can increase their inuence as leaders
by adopting a hands-o¤ managerial style and delegating authority to their division managers,
especially when they oversee large, complex, and opaque organizations (Section 3.2), whose
employees are compensated for performances (large !) and have high outside options (low ).
The analysis in Section 3.3 also suggests that generalist CEOs (who have relatively imprecise
information about e) can be more e¤ective than specialist CEOs, and that specialist CEOs
would particularly benet from adopting a hands-o¤ managerial style.
4.2 Corporate boards
In a typical public corporation, the CEO runs the company on a daily basis, but the board of
directors sets the strategy, approves major decisions, and has the right to replace the CEO. In
many cases, board members are executives in related industries, lawyers, bankers, accountants,
academics, and in some cases, savvy investors such as activist hedge fund managers (Gow, Shin,
and Srinivasan (2014)) and venture capitalists (even long after the IPO, see Celikyurt, Sevilir
and Shivdasani (2014)). These individuals often use their business, legal, and nance expertise,
to advise and direct the CEO on a variety of issues such as strategy, public relations, crisis
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management, and M&A. In many cases, however, the CEO has a di¤erent agenda. CEOs
may try to build and empire, maintain their reputation, or seek the quite life. Therefore,
monitoring the CEO and intervening as needed is an integral part of directorsduties.
Intervention, however, requires coordination among directors (e.g., to avoid free-riding).
Therefore, the e¤ective cost of intervention is higher in larger boards with more diverse and
busy directors. Since the ability of the principal (the board) to inuence the agent (the CEO)
is non-monotonic in c, the analysis suggests that the e¤ectiveness of the boards advisory role
is also non-monotonic (U-shape) in the number of directors, their diversity, busyness, and
independence. In particular, based on Section 3.1, a large board is a commitment device not
to intervene in the CEOs decision, and therefore, can be optimal. Importantly, when large
boards are optimal, they are also advising the CEO more e¤ectively, which can explain why
we observe many large boards (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).20
The analysis also sheds light on the optimal composition of the board, suggesting that
boards with a powerful CEO and a limited capacity of intervention can be optimal. This result
is consistent with Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), who observe that corporate boards
are often too friendlyto their CEOs. Moreover, the analysis suggests the a friendly board is
more likely to be optimal when the CEOs pay is highly sensitive to rm performances (high
!) or when the CEO does not fear intervention as much (low ). CEOs will not su¤er the
consequences of intervention if their reputation in the labor market is already established (e.g.,
long tenure, proximity to retirement) or if they are entitled to a generous severance package
which protects their compensation if they are red. This prediction di¤ers from Adams and
Ferreira (2007) who argue that friendly boards are particularly desired when the CEO dislikes
board monitoring the most. Indeed, in their model there is a hold-up problem: the board
monitors the CEO more intensively when the latter cooperates. A friendly board is a mean
by which the board commits not to monitor the CEO, and more commitment is needed when
monitoring inicts larger costs on the CEO (high value of parameter b in their model).21 In
addition, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that friendly board are less likely to be optimal
when the independent directors are better informed. My model o¤ers a di¤erent prediction:
20For related studies on optimal board size see also Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Harris and Raviv (2008),
and Raheja (2005).
21Adams and Ferreira (2007) also show that when board is highly informed, the opposite can hold since it
becomes too costly to incentivize the CEO to cooperate by setting a friendly board.
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better informed directors (information about actions or fundamentals) can have more inuence
on the CEO without intervention, i.e., when the board is friendly.
4.3 Private equity
Private equity investors (venture capital and leveraged buyout funds) typically hold board seats
and other control rights in their portfolio companies, which give them the power to make strate-
gic decisions, replace management, and even liquidate the rm (Kaplan and Stromberg (2003,
2004), Cornelli and Karakas (2015)). At the same time, these investors also provide exper-
tise and post-investment added value to their portfolio companies. Consistent with this view,
the empirical evidence suggests that VCs provide advice and support to small entrepreneurial
start-ups, help with the professionalization of the management team and the commercialization
of the product, foster innovation, and improve productivity.22 Similarly, in a typical leveraged
buyout, the private equity fund appoints experts from the industry (e.g., Ex-CEOs), consul-
tants, and its own general partners, as board members of the acquired company. Moreover,
many of the large PE shops have an in-house operational research team whose purpose is to
identify attractive investment opportunities, develop value creation plans for those investments,
and help the fund to turnaround the operations of the target rm after the investment is made
(e.g., cost-cutting, productivity improvements, repositioning, or acquisition opportunities).23
The implications of the model for corporate boards can also be applied to private equity,
as in most cases the private equity investors use the board of directors to control the company.
However, relative to boards of public companies, boards of private equity controlled rms are
likely to be better informed (see Section 3.3 for comparative statics with respect to the quality
of the principals private information) and su¤er from fewer coordination problems among
directors (see Section 3.1). Nevertheless, private equity rms tend to co-invest (often referred
to as club investment in leveraged buyouts and syndication in venture capital). When the deal
has more than one sponsor, the investors share the cash-ows and control rights in the company,
which can result in coordination problems between investors. Moreover, private equity rms
make multiple investments. A large number of portfolio companies increases the alternative
cost of intervention and the cost of becoming informed about each specic portfolio company.
22See Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002); Kortum and Lerner (2000); Bottazzi, Rin, and Hellmann (2008);
Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011); Gompers et al. (2016).
23See Kaplan, Strömberg (2009); Acharya et al. (2013); Gompers, Kaplan, Mukharlyamov (2016).
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While the motives behind co-investment and diversication are likely to be related to capital
constraints and risk-sharing, the analysis suggests that they may have additional real benets
by committing the private equity investors not to intervene in their portfolio companies.
4.4 Shareholder activism
Activist hedge funds have a market-wide perspective on asset valuation and performances of
peer companies that corporate boards of public companies often lack.24 In a typical campaign,
the activist buys a sizeable stake in a public company and then engages with the management
or the board of directors of the target rm, expressing her dissatisfaction or view of how
the company should be managed. Occasionally, if the company refuses to comply with the
activists demand, the activist ends up litigating or launching a proxy ght in order to oust
the incubment directors, gain board seats, and force her ideas on the company. Running a
successful proxy ght, however, is costly since it requires the activist to reach out to other
shareholders of the rm in order to win their vote.
Applied to this context, the analysis highlights that activist intervention can be counter-
productive. Therefore, policies that reduce the cost of intervention for activists (e.g., the
adoption of an easier proxy access) and forces that ease the coordination among shareholders
(e.g., the rise of institutional/index investment or the increased inuence of proxy advisory
rms) can have unintended adverse consequences. Moreover, the analysis can explain why some
activist hedge funds choose to le schedule 13-G instead of schedule 13-D, build reputation
for working constructively with management (e.g., ValueAct) as opposed to being adversarial
(e.g., Pershing Square),25 target companies with dispersed ownership or companies in which
obtaining signicant voting rights is too costly (large cap or dual class rms). In all of these
instances the activist at least partially commits not to force her ideas on the rm.
Related, activists investors can always exit their position by selling their stake in the com-
pany. If it is easier to exit (e.g., the stock is liquid and the negative price impact upon selling
is small) then a displeased activist might be tempted to sell her shares instead of intervening
24The idea that outsiders have information that insiders can learn from is central to a new literature that
studies how rms use information in stock prices to make investment decisions (e.g., see Bond, Edmans, and
Goldstein (2012) for a survey on real e¤ects of nancial markets).
25Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) assume that authority is non-contractible, but can be informally given
through commitments enforced by reputation.
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when she fails to inuence the board. In other words, the ease at which the activist can exit is
a commitment not to intervene by running a proxy ght. The analysis therefore suggests that
when the cost of intervention is high (c > cmin), exit complements the ability of the activist
to voice herself and a¤ect the board through communications. However, when the cost of
intervention is small (c < cmin), exit harms the ability of the activist to inuence the board
using her voice, and in this respect, exit substitutes voice.
5 Concluding remarks
Interactions between managers, directors, and investors are crucial to our understanding of
how corporations are managed and governed. In many of these interactions, contracts only
partially resolve the conicts of interests, and as a result, communication and intervention
become the primary mechanisms of governance. This paper sheds new light on corporate
governance by analyzing a principal-agent model with incomplete contracts and a top-down
information structure. Surprisingly, the main result of the paper demonstrates that a cred-
ible threat of intervention can decrease the incentives of the agent to follow the principals
instructions. In those cases, intervention prompts disobedience, communication is less e¤ective
with intervention than without it, and the two mechanisms substitute one another. The key
insight is that the possibility of intervention creates additional tension by providing the agent
with opportunity to challenge the principal to back her words with actions. Through this novel
channel intervention prompts disobedience. This result provides a novel argument as to why
a commitment not to intervene (and therefore, relying solely on communication) can be opti-
mal. In this respect, words do speak louder without actions. Building on this core insight, the
analysis considers several variants of the baseline model and provides novel predictions related
to managerial leadership, corporate boards, private equity, and shareholder activism.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose m 2M . Based on Lemma 1, the agents expected utility is8>>><>>>:
Pr[e   cjm]E[!v(e; R) + eje   c;m]
+ Pr[e <  cjm](E[!v(e; L)je <  c;m]  ) if xA = R
Pr[e < cjm]E[!v(e; L)je < c;m]
+ Pr[e  cjm](E[!v(e; R) + eje  c;m]  ) if xA = L:
(25)
Comparing the two terms, the agent chooses xA = L if and only if e  b (m), where
b (m)  Pr[
e <  cjm]  Pr[e  cjm]
Pr[ c  e < cjm]   !E[ej   c  e < c;m] (26)
as required.
Proof of Proposition 1. Based on Lemma 2, conditional on message m, xA = L , e 
b (m), where b (m) is given by (26). When the equilibrium is non-inuential, no message is
informative about e. Therefore, b (m) = bN for any m, where bN is given by (5).
Proof of Proposition 2. First, suppose an inuential equilibrium exists. According to
Lemma 2, for any m 2 M the agent chooses action L if and only if e  b (m) ; where b (m) is
given by (26). Therefore, Pr[xA(m; e) = R] = 1 G (b (m)). Using Lemma 1, if the principal
sends message m then her expected utility conditional on e is
E[uP je;m] = v(e; L) +
8><>:
(1 G (b (m))) ( c) if e <  c
(1 G (b (m))) e if e 2 [ c; c)
(1 G (b (m))) e +G (b (m)) (e  c) if e  c: (27)
Therefore, if e > 0, the principal chooses m 2 arg minm2M b (m) and if e < 0, the princi-
pal chooses m 2 arg maxm2M b (m). According to Denition 1, it must be minm2M b (m) <
maxm2M b (m) and both MR and ML are not empty.
Suppose m 2MR. Since m 2MR ) e  0, (26) can be rewritten as
b (m) =   Pr[
e  cjm]
Pr[0  e < cjm]   !E[ej0  e < c;m] (28)
which is always negative. Since e > 0 with probability one, the agent follows the principals
instructions and chooses action R with probability one.
Suppose m 2ML. Since m 2ML ) e < 0, (26) can be rewritten as
b (m) = 
Pr[e <  cjm]
Pr[ c  e < 0jm]   !E[ej   c  e < 0;m]: (29)
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Since b (m) = maxm2M b (m) for all m 2 ML, b (m) is invariant to m 2 ML. Since m 2 ML if
and only if e < 0, some algebra and integration over all m 2 ML show that b (m) = b (; c).
Therefore, in any inuential equilibrium, the agent follows the principals instructions and
chooses action L if and only if e  b (; c). Note that the intervention policy follows from
Lemma 1.
Next, I show that an inuential equilibrium always exists. Consider an equilibrium in which
the principal sends message mR if e  0 and message mL 6= mR otherwise. As was proved
above, the agent always follows the principals instructions if he observes message mR. Since
m = mL if and only if e < 0, (26) evaluated at mL can be rewritten as b (; c). Thus, the
agent follows the principals instructions to implement action L if and only if e  b (; c).
Given the agents expected behavior, it is in the best interest of the principal to follow the
proposed communication strategy. Finally, notice that since b (; c) > 0, this equilibrium is
indeed inuential. This completes part (i).
Finally, I prove part (ii). First notice that b (; c) > bN if and only if

!
"
Pr[e <  c]
Pr[ c  e < 0]   Pr[e <  c]  Pr[e > c]Pr[ c < e < c]
#
> E[ej   c  e < 0]  E[ej   c < e < c];
(30)
which always holds. Therefore, for any realization of e, the principal is weakly better o¤ under
inuential equilibrium. Indeed, if e  0 the principal is getting her preferred action under
inuential equilibrium without the need to intervene. If e < 0 then, because b (; c) > bN , the
principal is more likely to get her preferred action under inuential equilibrium, and therefore,
can save more of the intervention costs.
According to Proposition 1, in any non-inuential equilibrium, the agents expected payo¤
conditional on e is
E[uNA (e)] =
(
!E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e > c](!E[eje > c] + e   ) if e  bN
!E[v(e; R)] + e   Pr[e <  c](!E[eje <  c] + e + ) else, (31)
According to Proposition 2, the agents expected payo¤ conditional on e in any inuential
equilibrium is
E[uIA(e)] =
(
!E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e > 0](!E[eje > 0] + e) if e  b (; c)
!E[v(e; R)] + e   Pr[e <  c](!E[eje <  c] + e + ) else, (32)
Recall that bN < b (; c). Then, e  b (; c) then the agent is indi¤erent. If e  bN then
the agent is better o¤ under inuential equilibrium since not only action R is taken more
often, he also avoids intervention. If bN < e < b (; c) then a direct comparison shows that
E[uIA(e)]  E[uNA (e)] for all e in this range, as required.
Proof of Corollary 1. Part (i) follows trivially from (8). Consider part (ii), and let  and
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 be the pdf and cdf of e, respectively. Therefore,
b =
 ( c)  ! R 0 c  () d
 (0)   ( c) (33)
Notice that b =  E[eje < 0] for all c  jj, and if c 2 [0; jj) then
@b
@c
=
 ( c)
 (0)   ( c) ( + !c  b
) : (34)
Also note that @b

@c
< 0, !c   < b, which holds if and only if  (c) < 0 where
 (c)  !
 (0)
Z 0
 c
( + c) () d  : (35)
Notice that  (c) is a continuous and increasing function of c. Moreover,  (0) =   and
 (jj) = !E[eje < 0]   !   . Therefore, if  (jj)  0 then b decreases with c. If
 (jj) > 0 then by the intermediate value theorem, there is a unique cmin 2 (0; jj) such that
@b
@c
< 0, c < cmin. Based on (34), cmin satises (9), as required.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let  and  be the pdf and cdf of e, respectively. UP can be
rewritten from (14) as
UP = E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e  0]E[eje  0] (36)
+ (1 G (b))

 
Z  c

( + c) d () +
Z 0

d ()

:
Therefore,
@UP
@c
= g (b)
Z  c

( + c) d () 
Z 0

d ()

@b
@c
  (1 G (b))  ( c)
Note that the term in parentheses is positive. Therefore, if @b

@c
< 0 then @UP
@c
< 0. According
to part (ii) of Corollary 1, if =!  E[eje  0] + jj then @b
@c
< 0. Therefore, if =! 
E[eje  0] + jj then @UP
@c
< 0 as required for part (i). Suppose =! < E[eje  0] + jj.
Notice that UP (; c) is di¤erentiable in c and UP (; 0) > UP (; jj). Therefore, to prove part
(ii) it is su¢ cient to show limc!jj @UP@c > 0. Note that
lim
c!jj
@UP
@c
= g (b (; jj))
Z 0

d ()

@b
@c
jc=jj:
Therefore, limc!jj @UP@c > 0 if and only if
@b
@c
jc=jj > 0. According to Corollary 1, @b@c > 0 if
and only if c 2  cmin; jj and =! < E[eje  0] + jj. This completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Let  and  be the pdf and cdf of e, respectively. UA (; c) can
be rewritten from (16) as
UA = !E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e  0](!E[eje  0] + E[e]) + ( (0)   ( c))Z 1
b
( b) g () d:
(37)
Therefore
@UA
@
=   ( (0)   ( c)) (1 G (b)) @b

@
; (38)
and note that @b

@
> 0 implies @UA
@
< 0. Similarly,
@UA
@!
= E[v(e; L)] + Pr[e  0]E[eje  0]  ( (0)   ( c)) (1 G (b)) @b
@!
(39)
Based on (8), @b

@!
=  E[ej   c  e < 0]. Therefore, @UA
@!
can be rewritten as
@UA
@!
= E[v(e; L)] + Z 
0
 () d + (1 G (b))
Z 0
 c
 () d
> E[v(e; L)] + Z 
0
 () d +
Z 0
 c
 () d
= E[v(e; L)] + Z 
 c
 () d
 E[v(e; L)] + E[e] = E[v(e; R)]  0;
as required. The last inequality follows from the assumption that v(e; R)  0. Next,
@UA
@c
=  ( c)
Z 1
b
( b) g () d   ( (0)   ( c)) (1 G (b)) @b

@c
: (40)
Based on (34),
@UA
@c
=  ( c) (1 G (b)) [E[eje > b] +   !c]: (41)
Therefore, @UA
@c
> 0 if and only if
E[eje > b] +   !c > 0: (42)
Since @b

@
> 0, the LHS is increasing in . Suppose =!  E[eje < 0] + jj. According to
part (ii) of Corollary 1 @b

@c
< 0. Therefore, the LHS of (42) is decreasing in c. For this reason,
if (42) holds for c = jj then it holds for all c < jj. Note that if c = jj then (42) holds if
and only if
=! >  E[e=!je=! >  E[eje < 0]] + jj : (43)
40
However, if =!  E[eje < 0] + jj holds then (43) holds. Therefore, if =!  E[eje <
0] + jj then @UP
@c
> 0, which completes part (i). Suppose (43) does not hold. By the same
argument as above, limc!jj @UA@c < 0. Since limc!jj UA (; c) = UA (; jj) > UA (; 0), there
exists cP as required by part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6. Conditional on e and the agents decision, xA, and regardless of
the message sent by the principal to the agent, the principal solves
xP 2 arg max
x
f (e   x)2   c (x  xA)2g ) xP (xA;e) = xA + e   xA
1 + c
:
Conditional on xA and e, the principals utility is
uP =  (e   xP (xA;e))2   c(xP (xA;e)  xA)2 =   c
1 + c
(e   xA)2:
The agent expects the principal to follow intervention policy xP (xA;e), and therefore, given
message m, he solves
xA 2 arg max
xA
E[ (e +    xP (xA;e))2   (xP (xA;e)  xA)2jm]) xA = E[ejm] +  1 + c=c+ c:
It follows, at the communication stage, the principal behaves as if her preferences are repre-
sented by the utility function  (e   xA)2, and the agent behaves as if c = 1,  = 0 and his
preferences are represented by the utility function  (e +  1+c
=c+c
  xA)2.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the model without intervention.. As in Harris and Raviv
(2005), in any equilibrium, if the agent observes eA and the principal sends message m, the
agent chooses xA(eA;m) = eA + E[eP jm] + . Therefore, the principals expected utility from
sending message m is
 E[(eP + eA   xA(eA;m))2jeP ;m] =  (eP   E[eP jm]  )2; (44)
which is independent of eA, and hence, perfectly predictable by the principal. Intuitively, the
unknown private information of the agent is canceled by the agents (optimal) choice of xA.
We are back to the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982), where xA(eA;m) = eA + x^A (m)
where x^A (m) is given by the Crawford and Sobels model when only the principal has private
information.
Consider the model with intervention. Suppose that in equilibrium the agent follows a
linear strategy
xA(eA;m) = eA +  (m) ;
where  is a scalar and  () is a real function. Conditional on eP , message m, and the agents
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decision xA, the principal solves
max
y
fE[ (eP +H(xA;eA;m)  y)2jeP ]  c (y   xA)2g
where
H(xA;eA;m) = (xA (m) if  6= 0eA if  = 0:
Indeed, if  = 0 the principal does not learn anything from action xA about eA. Therefore,
the principal chooses
xP (xA;eP ;m) = xA + eP + E[H(xA;eA;m)]  xA
1 + c
:
The agent expects the principal to follow intervention policy xP (xA;eP ;m), and therefore,
given message m and the observation of eA, the agent solves
max
y
E
h
 (eP + eA +    xP (y;eP ;m))2   (xP (y;eP ;m)  y)2jeA;mi
= max
y
E
24  ceP+E[H(y;eA;m)] y1+c + eA   E[H(y;eA;m)] + 2
 
eP+E[H(y;eA;m)] y
1+c
2 jeA;m
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We rst argue that  = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. To see why, suppose on the contrary
 = 0 is an equilibrium. Then, E[H(y;eA;m)] = E[eA] and the agent chooses
xA(eA;m) = E[eP jm] + E[eA] + c2 + c
c2 + 
(eA   E[eA] + );
which implies  = c
2+c
c2+
6= 0, a contradiction. Suppose  6= 0. In this case, E[H(y;eA;m)] =
y (m)

and the agent chooses
xA(eA;m) = 1
1 + 1 

1+ 1 
1+c
1+c
eA + 11+c(c   1+c )(E[eP jm]  (m) ) + (m) + 
1 + 1 

1+ 1 
1+c
1+c
(45)
Matching coe¢ cients implies
 =
1
1 + 1 

1+ 1 
1+c
1+c
,  2

1;
  c
+ c2

:
Notice that  =  c
+c2
cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, if  =  c
+c2
then the second term in
(45) becomes  (m) +  c
+c2
. Requiring that this term is equal to  (m) (matching coe¢ cients)
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requires either  c
+c2
= 0 or  = 0. The former condition does not hold since  =  c
+c2
and we
prove that this can be an equilibrium only if  6= 0. The second condition does not hold by
the assumption  6= 0. Therefore, if  = 1 then matching the coe¢ cient on the second term
implies  (m) = E[eP jm] + 1+cc ; and hence,
xA(eA;m) = eA + E[eP jm] + 1 + c
c
:
This implies
xP (xA;eP ;m) = xA + eP   E[eP jm]  1+cc 
1 + c
:
Thus, if the principal expects the agent to chooses action xA(eA;m), the principals expected
utility conditional on eP and on sending message m is
uP (eP ;m) = E   (eP + eA   xP (xA(eA;m);eP ;m))2 c(xP (xA(eA;m);eP ;m)  xA(eA;m))2 jm;eP

= E
264  
eP + eA   (eA + E[eP jm] + 1+cc )  eP E[eP jm]  1+cc 1+c 2
 c
eP E[eP jm]  1+cc 
1+c
2 jm;eP
375
= E
24  eP   E[eP jm]  1+cc 
1 + c
c
!2
  c
 eP   E[eP jm]  1+cc 
1 + c
!2
jm;eP
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=
c
1 + c
E[ (eP   E[eP jm]  1 + c
c
)2jm;eP ]
Thus,
uP (eP ;m) =   c
1 + c
(eP   E[eP jm]  1 + c
c
)2 (46)
Recall that without intervention, the principal expected utility conditional on eP and on send-
ing message m is given by (44). One can see that the only di¤erence from (46) is that 
is replaced by1+c
c
, and the entire term is scaled by c
1+c
. It follows that at the communica-
tion stage, the principal behaves as if her preferences are represented by the utility function
 (eP +eA xA)2, and the agent behaves as if c =1,  = 0, and his preferences are represented
by the utility function  (eP + eA +  1+cc   xA)2.
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